Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 21 | Number 4

Article 3

1994

The Constitutionality of New York State's
Affirmative Action Law
John J. Sullivan

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
John J. Sullivan, The Constitutionality of New York State's Affirmative Action Law, 21 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1107 (1994).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol21/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NEW YORK
STATE'S AFFIRMATIVE ACTION LAW
I. Introduction
The term "affirmative action" has different meanings for different people. Some may view it as a procedure whereby minorities
and minority groups receive public assistance to help compensate
for years of past public and private discrimination.' Others, however, may view the concept as a policy that discriminates against
non-minorities to achieve a politically correct racial balance in the
workforce and business world.2 What arguably began as a goal to
eradicate the lingering effects of racial segregation 3 has evolved
into complex national, state, and municipal programs. These programs accord special financing and instructional assistance to small
and minority businesses, require non-minorities to use good faith
efforts to hire minorities, and most importantly for purposes of this
Note, set aside certain percentages of public contracts for various
minority groups.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits states from denying individuals the equal protection of
the laws.4 In City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,5 the United
States Supreme Court attempted to locate the intersection of equal
protection guarantees and state laws that mandate or authorize affirmative action programs in public contracting.
1. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396-97 (1978) (Marshall,
J., concurring).
2. Perhaps the most noted opponent of affirmative action programs in the 1992
.Presidential election was Republican Pat Buchanan. In his campaign for the Republican nomination, Buchanan vowed to go through the federal government "department
by department and agency by agency, and root out the whole rotten infrastructure of
reverse discrimination, root and branch." Ralph Z. Hallow, Buchanan Vows Purge of
Affirmative Action, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1992, at Al.
3. The term "affirmative action" was first used in the Kennedy Administration's
Executive Order 10,925, which established the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity in 1961. Section 301(1) forbade all government contractors
from discriminating against any employee or applicant for employment on the basis of
race and required all contractors to "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants
are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to
their race, creed, color, or national origin." 3 C.F.R. §§ 448, 450 (1959-63 comp.). The
term was used again in Section 706(g) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1989), and in President Johnson's accompanying Executive Order
11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1964-65). See James E. Jones, Jr., The Origins of Affirmative
Action, 21 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 383, 395-99 (1988).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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The Court in Croson struck down an affirmative action law enacted by the city of Richmond, Virginia. 6 The Richmond plan required all prime contractors receiving public construction contracts
to subcontract at least thirty percent of the contract's dollar
amount to Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs).7 The Supreme
Court held that the plan violated the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection because the plan excluded non-minority contractors from a fixed percentage of public contracts without first showing that the city had previously discriminated against minorities in
its public contracting. 8 The Court subjected Richmond's plan to
the rigorous standard of strict scrutiny, 9 stating that "benign" racial
classifications, as remedial measures, 10 must be narrowly tailored

6. Id. at 485-86.
7. The plan defined an MBE as a firm at least 51% owned and controlled by
members of one or more of the following minority groups: Blacks, Spanish-speaking,
Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts. The plan made no restriction on the state or
municipality from which the MBE must come, only that the owners had to be United
States citizens. Id. at 478-79.
8. Id. at 505.
9. In evaluating whether a statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment, the least
strenuous standard of review is often referred to as rational basis review, where the
government action need only rationally serve a legitimate governmental interest. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (employing lowest level scrutiny where
no discriminatory purpose is shown and the statute is racially neutral on its face but
may adversely affect only certain racial groups); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (applying rational basis review to a zoning ordinance that prevented construction of home for the mentally retarded in a residential
neighborhood); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (utilizing lowest level scrutiny when analyzing a state school financing plan whereby students from
wealthier neighborhoods benefitted from higher expenditures than students from areas with less valuable property).
Intermediate review requires the legislation to be substantially related to an important state interest. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n,
497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990) (holding that benign race-conscious measures authorized
by Congress, whether remedial or not, are constitutional if they serve important governmental objectives and are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying intermediate review to
classifications by gender). Finally, strict scrutiny applies whenever a state classifies by
race or ethnicity. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.).
10. At least one circuit has analogized affirmative action plans to structural injunctions, such as those that ended school segregation and mandated busing and district
gerrymandering, stating that as with relief for other constitutional violations, the
scope of the remedy must depend upon the scope of the violation. O'Donnell Constr.
Corp. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)).
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to address a compelling state interest, such as rectifying the effects
of identifiable racial discrimination. 1'
The state of New York has attempted to implement its own
statewide affirmative action plan since 1988, when it first enacted
Executive Law Article 15-A. 12 However, it has since been constrained by Croson. Article 15-A is the codification of the state's
affirmative action law for public works contracts; it seeks to increase minority and female participation in the state's contracting
process. 3 Enforcement of the New York plan depends largely
upon administrative regulation rather than upon the language of
the statute.' The state's Office of Minority and Women's Business
Development (OMWBD),' 5 the agency responsible for enforcement, promulgated enforcement regulations soon after enactment
of Article 15-A.
The regulations remained in effect until 1990, when a non-minority owned contractor successfully sought a preliminary injunction
to prevent enforcement of the plan. 6 Although neither Article 15A nor the original regulations called for statewide minimum participation requirements or quotas, such as those struck down in
Croson,17 their constitutionality was nevertheless questioned. Several contractors challenged the law on equal protection grounds
when their inability to meet project-specific requirements that they
11. Justice O'Connor, who delivered the opinion of the Court, stated in a portion
of her opinion not joined by a majority of the Court, that strict scrutiny would apply
to any review of state-enacted race conscious measures. 488 U.S. at 493. In Metro
Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547, the Court's majority opinion by Justice Brennan tacitly
recognized that strict scrutiny now applies to state and municipal measures. Id. at 565.
Furthermore, the lower federal courts have adopted this standard in assessing the
constitutionality of the various state and local affirmative action statutes. See, e.g.,
Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Contractors, Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 50, 62 (2d Cir.
1992); Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 1991); Cone
Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908, 913 (11th Cir. 1990).
12. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 310-318 (McKinney 1993).
13. Id. § 311(3)(a); see also Legislative Findings and Declaration, 1988 N.Y. LAWS,
ch. 261, § 62.
14. See infra part III.
15. Article 15-A created the OMWBD and the position of Director of OMWBD.
The statute empowers the Director to issue rules and regulations necessary for its
enforcement. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 311(1); see infra part I1.
16. See Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Contractors, Inc. v. Cuomo, 743 F. Supp. 977
(N.D.N.Y. 1990) [Harrison I].
17. The Richmond plan had required all prime contractors to whom the city
awarded construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar value of the
contract to MBEs. 488 U.S. at 477; see infra notes 27-51 and accompanying text. The
New York law allows the individual state agencies to set minority participation goals
for each project or contract. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 313; see infra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
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enterprises (W/MBEs) jeopemploy women- and minority-owned
18
ardized their public contracts.
OMWBD repealed the original compliance regulations, citing
both the litigation and the Supreme Court's decision in Croson.19
Because Croson requires a state to make findings of prior discrimination before implementing an affirmative action plan,2" the director of the OMWBD 21 promulgated emergency regulations that
suspended the participation goals of Article 15-A pending a final
determination of the constitutionality of the plan.22 New York now
claims that it has made the proper findings to support its aggressive
affirmative action plan, and, in July 1992, the state issued another
version of the compliance regulations,23 which may or may not
withstand an equal protection challenge under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In addition to New York, a number of states and the District of
Columbia have enacted various forms of affirmative action legislation that have been challenged on equal protection grounds.24 The
success of the complainants in these suits has varied in both the
form of the legislation and the court hearing the case. Consequently, the federal courts have yet to agree on a uniform standard
of what constitutes a finding of past discrimination sufficient to
support a plan. Some courts have reasoned that the Croson Court
failed to enunciate a clear standard and only responded to the plan
it struck down. Furthermore, a number of courts have avoided
18. See Harrison I, 743 F. Supp. at 978; see infra notes 136-144 and accompanying

text.
19. See Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Contractors, Inc. v. Cuomo, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13962, Oct. 1, 1991, at *11 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd 981 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1992) [Harrison II].
20. 488 U.S. at 505.
21. See supra note 15.
22. See Harrison II, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13962, at *12.
23. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. IX § 540-44 (1992).
24. See, e.g., O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (striking down District of Columbia's plan requiring 35% of all construction work to be set aside for MBEs); Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910

(9th Cir. 1991) (remanding county plan calling for separate MBE participation goals
on each project for determination of compelling interest); Michigan Road Builders
Ass'n v. Blanchard, 761 F. Supp. 1303 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (upholding Michigan plan in

conjunction with federal set aside program using both federal and state funds).
25. See, e.g., Harrison II, 981 F.2d at 61-62 ("Croson made only broad pronouncements concerning the findings necessary to support a state's affirmative action plan
and generally provided that the plan had to be narrowly tailored, but left the validity
of particular plans to be assessed on a case-by-case basis"); Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908, 913 (11th Cir. 1990). In Cone Corp., the Eleventh Circuit
stated that Croson did not "provide a set of standards or guidelines describing the
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resolution of the constitutional issues altogether by dismissing
equal protection challenges on the grounds of lack of standing.26 A
workable standard is necessary to complete any evaluation of New
York's latest attempt to codify a policy of affirmative action in the
awarding of public contracts.
This Note examines the present state of affirmative action jurisprudence to determine whether the amended version of New
York's compliance regulations accompanying Article 15-A survives
constitutional scrutiny. Part II examines the Croson decision and
its impact in the lower federal courts and in the states. Part III
looks at Article 15-A, its history, its associated administrative regulations, and the case law that has reviewed it. Part IV evaluates the
statute and the present compliance regulations in light of the interpretations of Croson in the lower federal courts, recommends the
appropriate standard, and concludes, with some exceptions, that
Article 15-A will survive constitutional scrutiny.
II. Constitutional Background
A. Croson
In City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,27 the Supreme Court
assessed the validity of a Richmond, Virginia ordinance that required all contractors receiving public construction contracts to
subcontract to MBEs at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of
the contract.28 The controversy arose when the city, after first
awarding a contract on a municipal construction project to a nonminority owned firm, revoked the contract when the firm was unable to procure materials from a qualified MBE.29 Following an
kind of MBE plan that would pass constitutional muster.... The Court described an
outer perimeter of unacceptable behavior; plans which fall inside of that perimeter
are clearly unconstitutional, while the constitutionality of plans which fall on or
outside the perimeter apparently depends on the contours of the individual plan." Id.
See also Nina Farber, Comment, Justifying Affirmative Action After City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson: The Court Needs a Standard for Proving Past Discrimination, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 975, 981 (1990) ("although the particular outcome in Croson was

proper, the Court failed to establish a clear standard for determining when a government agency has made sufficient findings of past discrimination to support a compelling governmental interest in remedying racial discrimination").
26. Cone Corp. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 921 F.2d 1190 (11th Cir. 1991);
Capeletti Bros., Inc. v. Broward County, 738 F. Supp. 1415 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
27. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
28. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
29. 488 U.S. at 483.
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arduous series of appeals, 30 the Supreme Court affirmed the Court
of Appeals decision striking down the plan. 31 The Supreme Court
expressed skepticism about the true nature of the program, saying
that "searching judicial inquiry" is necessary to ensure that racebased measures are indeed remedial rather than motivated by "ille'32
gitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.
In defense of the affirmative action ordinance, Richmond had
claimed that the plan was an attempt to remedy the effects of past
discrimination exhibited both in Richmond and nationwide.33 The
city cited a number of sources to support its claims. It relied on a
study that showed a wide discrepancy between the amount of Richmond's public contracting work performed by minority-owned contractors and the size of the local black population. 34 Richmond
also referred to Congressional findings of nationwide discrimination to infer similar violations within its own boundaries. 35 Furthermore, the city claimed that the extremely low MBE
30. Upon initially addressing J.A. Croson's challenge, the district court upheld all
aspects of the plan, and a divided court of appeals affirmed. 779 F.2d 181 (4th Cir.
1985). The court of appeals held that it was reasonable for Richmond to conclude
that the nationwide findings of discrimination used to support the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701, 6705-6708, 6710 (1994), were sufficient to
serve as the cause of low minority participation in Richmond's construction industry.
See infra note 35.
Following the court of appeals decision, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), which struck down an employment agreement between local school authorities and a teachers union that tied layoffs to the racial makeup of the student body. The Court reversed a lower court
holding that the need for role models for minority students was a sufficient interest to
justify the plan. A plurality of the Court indicated that the equal protection clause
required a "showing of prior discrimination by the government unit involved." Id. at
274.
Subsequent to its decision in Wygant, the Court granted J.A. Croson's petition for
certiorari and vacated the opinion of the court of appeals. The Court remanded the
case and instructed the court of appeals to further consider the plaintiff's claim in
light of the decision in Wygant. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 478 U.S. 1016
(1986). On remand, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit struck down Richmond's
plan, citing the city's unjustified reliance on claims of historical discrimination as the
basis for its compelling interest. 822 F.2d 1355, 1357 (4th Cir. 1987).
31. Croson, 488 U.S. at 511.
32. Id. at 493.
33. Id. at 498.
34. The study showed that minority businesses received only .67% of prime contracts from the city although minorities constituted 50% of the city's population. Id.
at 499.
35. Richmond and the district court that first approved the plan relied on Congressional findings used to support a set-aside provision in the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701, 6705-6708, 6710 (1994), upheld by the Court in
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Croson, 488 U.S. at 499.
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membership in a local contractors' association was another indicator of discrimination.36
In applying the strict scrutiny test, 37 the Court rejected Richmond's justification for the requirement that contractors set aside
thirty percent of all subcontracting work for MBEs. Specifically,
the Court held that generalized assertions of past discrimination in
an industry are insufficient to justify affirmative action; 38 general
allegations of past societal discrimination 39 supported by questionably relevant statistics4° would not support the exclusion of nonminority businesses from a substantial percentage of public contracting work solely on the basis of race. The Court also invalidated the municipality's use of Congress's findings of nationwide
discrimination, 4 ' stating that when a state or municipality seeks to
enact such a race-conscious measure, it must find discrimination
within its borders-discrimination in one jurisdiction cannot be inferred from a finding of discrimination in another.42 In sum, the
state or municipality must have " 'a strong basis in evidence for its
conclusion that remedial action [is] necessary.' ",43
The Court also criticized Richmond's use of a thirty percent set
aside provision for MBEs." First, it stated that the city should
have employed alternative race-neutral remedies before enacting a
race-conscious measure, because many of the barriers to market
entry existed independent of race.45 In addition, the Court found
36. 488 U.S. at 503.
37. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.

38. 488 U.S. at 498.
39. Id. at 498.
40. Id. at 501.
41. See supra note 35. In Croson, the Court held that Congress was entitled to use
more generalized assertions in support of its program because it had specific authority
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce its mandate of equal protection for all. 488 U.S. at 490. Because the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted as a
limit on states' powers, it did not follow that the states possess similar independent
remedial authority. Id.
42. 488 U.S. at 505.
43. Id. at 500 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)).

44. Id. at 508.
45. Id. at 507. At least one commentator views these measures as "failed alternatives." See Mary C. Daly, Rebuilding the City of Richmond: Congress's Power to Authorize the States to Implement Race-Conscious Affirmative Action Plans, 33 B.C. L.
REV. 903, 929-30 (1992). Professor Daly argues that race-neutral programs do not
help remedy discrimination once the state or local government has decided to enact
race-conscious legislation. At this point, the governing body has already determined
that neutral measures will not be as effective as race conscious legislation. Id.
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the plan's strict waiver allowances 46 troublesome. Unlike the Congressional plan previously upheld in Fullilove v. Klutznick,4 7 Richmond would not waive the thirty percent requirement even upon
an affirmative showing that an MBE's higher bid did not result
from prior discrimination. 48 Finally, the combination of the
Court's perception that the plan was over-inclusive 49 and the fact
that the City Council that enacted the plan was made up of a majority of African-Americans, 50 led the Court to doubt whether
Richmond really intended to ameliorate the effects of discrimination, as it had claimed.'
B.

Croson In Action
Although the Croson Court explained why the Richmond plan
was unacceptable, it did not affirmatively describe the parameters
of a satisfactory plan. 2 Several lower federal courts have proposed
model affirmative action plans to which to compare actual state
and municipal plans to determine their constitutionality. In partic53
ular, the Ninth Circuit in Coral Construction Co. v. King County,
relying primarily on the Eleventh Circuit 5 4 has fashioned a detailed prototype that a statute should resemble before passing constitutional muster; the court specified the types of findings of
discrimination that establish a compelling governmental interest
and described the characteristics of a narrowly tailored plan.
1.

Compelling Interest
The application of the strict scrutiny standard in reviewing the
constitutionality of an affirmative action statute requires that the
state have a compelling interest in enacting race-conscious legisla-

46. The contracting agency could only waive the 30 percent requirement if there
was a showing that an insufficient number of MBEs were available to meet it. Croson,

488 U.S. at 508.
47. 448 U.S. 448 (1980); see supra note 35.
48. Croson, 488 U.S. at 508.
49. Richmond's meager findings only applied to African-Americans; there was absolutely no evidence of discrimination against the other minority groups included in
the plan. Id. at 506.
50. Id. at 495 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
51. "The random inclusion of racial groups that, as a practical matter, may never
have suffered from discrimination in the construction industry in Richmond suggests
that perhaps the city's purpose was not in fact to remedy past discrimination." Id. at
506; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text.
52. Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908, 913 (11th Cir. 1990); see
supra note 25.
53. 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991).
54. Cone Corp., 908 F.2d 908.
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tion.55 The interest in this context is the remedying of prior actual
and identifiable systematic discrimination in the public contracting
process.56 Unless the state actually perpetuated the discrimination,
either actively in its awarding of contracts, or tacitly through its
dealings with firms that discriminate, no wrong exists to be remedied. 57 To support a claim of discrimination, the state or municipality must first establish through concrete findings the existence of
the racial bias within its own borders. 58 As the Court stated conclusively in Croson, general assertions of society-wide discrimination will not suffice.59
According to the Ninth Circuit's Coral Construction Co. model,
the findings produced by the state should ideally include some
combination of statistical and anecdotal evidence that conclusively
establishes discrimination. 6° At a minimum, the state must include
statistics showing that minority-owned contractors have been
awarded a disproportionately small number of contracts compared
to the number of minority-owned contractors qualified to perform
the work for which the contracts called. 61 When the statistical disparities are especially egregious, statistical evidence may stand
alone to support a plan,62 but the disparities will be subject to close
examination because such evidence "often does not fully account
for the complex factors and motivations guiding employment decisions, many of which may be entirely race-neutral. '' 63 A complementary presentation of anecdotal evidence' clarifies the statistics
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Coral Constr. Co., 941 F.2d at 916; see supra text accompanying notes 9-11.
Coral Constr. Co., 941 F.2d at 916.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 38.

60. 941 F.2d at 919; accord O'Donnell Constr. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 963
F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
61. 941 F.2d at 919.
62. Id. at 918.
63. Id. at 919. Obviously, not all observers agree that numbers alone can ever
prove discrimination. Senator Hatch illustrated during Justice Ginsburg's confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee how statistics can deceive. The
Senator posed a hypothetical where a small business had hired fifty employees in the
past thirteen years, none of whom were black. He asked the Justice if she thought
that such numbers indicated discriminatory hiring practices, to which she responded
in the affirmative. Hatch then told her that since her appointment to the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 1980, "you've not had a black clerk of the fifty that
you've hired. I know that's not discrimination." Mike Kirkland, Senate Panel Opens
Ginsburg Nomination Hearing, PROPRIETARY TO THE UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL,

July 20, 1993.

64. The court in Coral Construction Co. referred approvingly to testimony by various local contractors who claimed to have suffered from discriminatory practices at
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and enhances their impact, especially when statistical disparities
are observable but66not outrageous; 65 anecdotal evidence alone,
however, is flawed.
Despite the unequivocal language in Croson requiring the determination of discrimination before enactment of race-conscious relief,67 the Ninth Circuit did not consider the timing of the findings
too crucial to the legitimacy of an affirmative action plan. It did
recognize that a state or municipality ideally should produce all
findings before the enactment of such a measure. The court in
Coral Construction Co. stated that a jurisdiction "must have some
concrete evidence ... before it may adopt a remedial program...
[A]ny program adopted without some legitimate evidence of discrimination is presumptively invalid. ' 68 The court concluded, however, that the statute at issue did not fail simply because the locality
produced the balance of the evidence after enactment.69 In the
Ninth Circuit's view, a court may evaluate the legitimacy of the
program based on all the evidence presented, regardless of when
70
the government obtained it.
While the timing rule that the Coral Construction Co. court
enunciated was quite clear, the rule's origins are rather murky.
Although Croson unequivocally requires that "[s]tates and their
subdivisions ... must identify [the] discrimination ... with some
specificity before they may use race-conscious relief,"'1 the Ninth
Circuit held that to disqualify post-enactment findings from review
the hands of prime contractors performing work for the County. For example, one
contractor testified that his firm had been in line to receive work on a pool construction project for the Goodwill Games, but lost the contract when the County relaxed
its MBE requirements. 941 F.2d at 918. The Eleventh Circuit in Cone Corp. referred

to testimony that some prime contractors who received estimates from MBEs, refused
to submit those estimates with their bids. 908 F.2d at 916. That court also cited evidence that material suppliers would frequently give discounts to non-minority firms

only, to the exclusion of MBEs. Id.
65. Coral Constr. Co., 941 F.2d at 919.
66. "While anecdotal evidence may suffice to prove individual claims of discrimi-

nation, rarely, if ever, can such evidence show a systematic pattern necessary for the
adoption of an affirmative action plan ....

Without a statistical foundation, the pic-

ture is incomplete." Id.
67. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 504.
68. 941 F.2d at 920.
69. Id. at 921.
70. Id. at 920-21. The court specifically refused to limit judicial review to findings
provided before enactment, Id. at 920, and instead remanded the case to the district
court to evaluate all the evidence that the county had since gathered. Id. at 922.
New York accepts the Ninth Circuit's rule without reservation and even purports to
find support for the rule in Croson. See infra notes 215 - 217.
71. 488 U.S. at 504 (emphasis added).
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would conflict with a state's affirmative duty to correct its own denial of equal'protection to minorities.72 If a state or municipality
possessed evidence of its own discriminatory practices, it could face
constitutional culpability for failing to act. 73 Assuming that remedial action is eventually found to be justified, the court stated that
its approach would eliminate the dilemma facing a state or municipality in choosing between moving prematurely or waiting for detailed findings, which could possibly exacerbate the effects of
systematic discrimination.74
In formulating its timing rule, the court in Coral Construction
Co. relied on a pair of companion Supreme Court cases, Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.75 and Mount
Healthy School District v. Doyle.7 6 The Ninth Circuit interpreted
these cases as standing for the proposition that state action that
might violate civil rights is not absolutely forbidden if the state can
show an otherwise legitimate reason for the conduct. 77 In Arlington Heights, the Court refused to reverse a municipality's refusal to
rezone residential land for low- and moderate-income housing, despite allegations that the municipality's decision may have been
motivated in part by a racially discriminatory purpose.78 The Court
noted that if the complainants had made a threshold showing that
the denial of rezoning was in fact partially motivated by race, the
burden of proof would shift to the municipality to show that it
would have made the same decision absent any influence from a
discriminatory purpose. 9 Similarly, in Mount Healthy the Court
held that the district court should have granted the defendant
school district, which was accused of wrongfully firing a teacher for
the exercise of his First Amendment rights, the opportunity to
72. " '[Tlhe State has the power to eradicate racial discrimination and its effects in
both public and private sectors, and the absolute duty to do so where those wrongs
were caused intentionally by the State itself.'" Coral Constr. Co., 941 F.2d at 920
(alteration in original) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
73. Coral Constr. Co., 941 F.2d at 921.
74. Id.
75. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
76. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
77. Coral Constr. Co., 941 F.2d at 921.
78. The Court adopted the findings of the District Court that the municipality was
motivated "by a desire 'to protect property values and the integrity of the Village's

zoning plan,' "429 U.S. at 259 (quoting Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D.III. 1974)), not by race, and held that the
plaintiffs had not in fact proven a racially discriminatory intent, required before
heightened scrutiny will apply. Id. at 270-71; see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
248 (1976); supra note 9.
79. 429 U.S. at 270 n.21.
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show that it would have terminated the plaintiff even if he had not
engaged in the protected conduct. 80
The court in Coral Construction Co. analogized the decisions by
the zoning board in Arlington Heights and by the school district in
Mount Healthy to the enactment of an affirmative action plan by a
state or municipality. 81 Just as the school district and zoning board
should have been granted the opportunity to rebut claims that they
had acted with an improper purpose, King County should have
been allowed to justify its plan by producing facts that objectively
supported the need for the plan, regardless of the time frame in
which the facts were gathered.8 2 Furthermore, in the interest of
fairness, the Ninth Circuit stated that district court should have
granted the complainants the opportunity to contest the findings of
the County.83
Although no circuit court has specifically rejected the Ninth Circuit's timing rule, the D.C. Circuit essentially ignored it in
O'Donnell Construction Co. v. District of Columbia.84 The circuit
court reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction that sought to
enjoin the enforcement of the District's set-aside program. 85 The
set-aside plan called for a thirty-five percent minority participation
86
and sought to achieve this goal by instituting "sheltered markets
in which only certified MBEs could bid. The District claimed that
it had a compelling interest to establish the plan and used both
statistical87 and anecdotal evidence 88 to show that MBEs faced
multiple institutional barriers that did not appear to hinder the success of non-minorities. Although the district court accepted the
findings as sufficient evidence of past discrimination, the court of
80. Id. at 287.
81. 941 F.2d at 921.

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 963 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
85. Id. at 429.

86. "In a sheltered market, agencies set aside contracts and subcontracts for 'limited competition' in bidding among MBEs, to the exclusion of all others. Only MBEs

certified by the [city] are permitted to participate in the sheltered markets." Id. at 422
(citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 1147(b)).
87. The city awarded only 3.4% of all its construction contracting work to MBEs,
while the city somehow thought that MBEs were capable of performing 34%, a conclusion that puzzled the court. O'Donnell Constr. Co., 963 F.2d at 426.
88. The city heard testimony from several witnesses concerning the difficulty they

faced as minority contractors, including testimony about discrimination by white
firms. Id. at 427.
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appeals dismissed them as conclusory.8 9 It stated that the city did
not compile the statistics to demonstrate systematic discrimination,
but rather to show that the desired participation goal was attainable. 90 The court determined that much of the anecdotal testimony
dealt with structural impediments, such as bonding and finance requirements, that any new or small business would face. 91 Furthermore, the court held that evidence of discrimination in the private
sector alone would be insufficient to support a system-wide
remedy.92
The court of appeals did not need to comment on whether the
city could use post-enactment findings to support the plan at issue,
as the appeal was taken from the denial of a preliminary injunction, rather than a final judgment on the merits. In holding that an
injunction was proper, however, the court found a strong likelihood that the plaintiff would prevail on the equal protection challenge to the set-aside plan. 93 It arguably assumed, without
deciding, that the rule enunciated in Croson would require the factual basis to accompany rather than follow the legislation. 94
2.

Narrowly Tailored Remedy

The second prong of strict scrutiny requires that the remedial
measure be narrowly tailored to address the compelling interest.
The Ninth Circuit in Coral Construction Co. identified three factors
that indicate when an affirmative action plan is narrowly tailored to
remedy past discrimination. First, the state or municipality must
exhaust race-neutral measures before or in conjunction with implementing race-conscious alternatives; 95 second, it must adopt a flexible plan 9 6 to allow for varying scenarios; and third, it must limit the
plan in geographic scope to firms operating within its boundaries. 97
89. "The idea that discrimination caused the low percentage is nothing more than
a hypothesis ....
The hypothesis was never tested. There are many other possible
explanations for the ... figure." Id. at 426.
90. Id. at 427.

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. O'Donnell Constr. Co.,963 F.2d at 428.
94. "[The District's] legislation must rest on evidence at least approaching a prima
facie case of racial discrimination in the relevant industry." Id. at 424. " '[The states

and [municipalities] must identify that discrimination, public or private, with some
specificity before they may use race-conscious relief.' "Id. at 425 (quoting Croson, 488
U.S. at 504); see supra note 67.
95. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
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a. Race Neutral Alternatives
The court in Coral Construction Co. recommended such raceneutral options as training sessions and information programs,
elimination of bonding requirements, and relaxed credit for small
businesses. 98 These alternatives would allow the state to increase
minority participation without attaching the stigma of inferiority
that may arise when members of society receive preferential treatment based on considerations other than merit.99 Furthermore,
race-neutral measures can remedy many of the problems encountered by minority contractors, which tend to be small, less established firms that experience difficulties common to all new
businesses. 100 The court emphasized that in enacting these types of
measures, the state or municipality should not exceed its legal authority-for example, the state constitution or other legislation
may prohibit the relaxing of bonding requirements-and the state
need not "exhaust every alternative, however irrational, costly, unreasonable, and unlikely to succeed such alternative might be."''1 1
b.

Program Flexibility

A strong sign of flexibility is the use of minority participation
goals on a case-by-case basis rather than rigid system-wide numerical quotas.10 2 Another important requirement for flexibility is a
system that allows the state to waive the goals when, despite the
contractor's good faith efforts, compliance is impracticable. Examples of impracticability include scenarios where qualified MBEs actually affected by past discrimination are not available or when the
lowest bid by an MBE is significantly higher than a bid by a nonminority firm. 10 3 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit in Coral Construction Co. stated without elaboration that no state's or munici98. Coral Constr. Co., 941 F.2d at 923.
99. Id. at 922. Various Justices on the Supreme Court have voiced the fear that
racial classifications, whether benign or otherwise, carry a danger of promoting notions of inferiority. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(opinion of O'Connor, J.); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.) ("[P]referential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based on a factor having no relation to individual worth.").
100. Coral Constr. Co., 941 F.2d at 922-23 n.12.
101. Id. at 923.
102. Id. at 922. Furthermore, "a quota 'rests upon the completely unrealistic assumption that minorities will choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their
representation in the local population.' " Id. at 924 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 507).
103. Coral Constr. Co., at 922
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pality's plan should ever set participation requirements higher than
fifty percent of a project's contracting dollars. 1°4
c. Limited GeographicScope
The coverage of the plan should be limited to the geographic
boundaries of the jurisdiction enacting it. 10 5 Therefore, if municipality "A" enacts an affirmative action plan, only those MBEs that
do business within municipality "A" may qualify for set-aside requirements. 10 6 Whether firms operating in different jurisdictions
have suffered discrimination is irrelevant, because the plan can
only remedy the effects of discrimination within its own jurisdiction. Firms from outside municipality "A," which may have suffered discrimination in their respective areas of operations, are not
within the class found to have suffered discrimination within
"A.,,l

0 7

III. New York's Affirmative Action History and Article 15-A
The origins of New York's current program can be traced to the
1970s, when the New York State Legislature began enacting smallscale affirmative action programs, usually related to specific agencies and projects. For example, through Article 8 of the Public Authorities Law,108 the state created various agencies empowered
with the authority to use set-aside contracts.10 9 As facially neutral
statutes," 0 these provisions of the Public Authorities Law have not
104. Id. The court gave no explanation for the 50% limit, but merely cited Cone
Corp., 908 F.2d 908, 917 for the proposition. The Eleventh Circuit in Cone Corp. took
the fifty percent limit from the affirmative action plan that it was addressing.
105. Id. at 925.
106. Id.
107. The court in Coral Construction. Co. struck down part of the County's plan
that allowed outside firms that were found to have suffered discrimination within
their sphere of operation to qualify for preferential treatment in King County. "Since
the County's interest is limited to the eradication of discrimination within King
County, the only question that the County may ask is whether a business has been
discriminated against in King County." Id. at 925.
108. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1690-1699 (McKinney 1981).
109. Article 8 of the Public Authorities Law created the Dormitory Authority of
the State of New York (DASNY), id. at § 1691, and allowed DASNY to employ setaside programs in its contracting work at specific State University of New York
(SUNY) and City University of New York (CUNY) schools. The act specifically authorized set-asides only for disadvantaged small businesses, id. at § 1697, while also
including a definition of minority business enterprises which may or may not qualify
as disadvantaged small business. Id. at § 1695. DASNY did use set-aside contracts for
its expansion of Hostos Community College in the South Bronx and for City College
in Manhattan.
110. See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1690-1699.
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been challenged. Furthermore, in order to comply with federal
programs requiring set-aside goals, New York has granted the Department of Transportation (DOT) the capacity to employ setasides on projects that use federal funds.111 The DOT's program
withstood a facial and an as-applied challenge with respect to contracts using federal funds, but when the DOT attempted to institute a similar program on projects funded exclusively by the state,
a New York State appellate court struck the program down.1 12 The
court held that as an agency within the executive branch of the
state government, the DOT was not allowed to unilaterally institute an affirmative
action program without specific legislative
11 3
authority.
In 1988, the state legislature enacted Article 15-A, entitled "Participation by Minority Groups Members and Women with Respect
to State Contracts." 1 4 The act defined a number of important
terms relevant to its provisions, including the qualifications for a
firm to be considered a Minority Business Enterprise and Minority
Group Member. A "Minority Business Enterprise" is defined as a
corporation, partnership or sole proprietorship, which is at least
fifty-percent substantially and continuously owned and controlled
by one or more minority group members and which is authorized
to do business in the state.11 5 A "certified business" is a business
verified by the newly created Office of Minority and Women's
Business Development's" 6 regulatory process as a minority- or women-owned enterprise." 7 The term "minority group member" en111. See, e.g., N.Y. HIcH. LAW § 85 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1993), and N.Y.
TRANSP. LAW § 428 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1993), which require the Dep't. of
Transportation (DOT) to comply with Federal law. The applicable Federal law includes: Public Works Employment Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 690 (1988); Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1977 FSTAA), Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 105 (1988);
Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 (STURAA),
Pub. L. No. 100-17 § 106(c) (1988).
112. Rex Paving v. White, 531 N.Y.S.2d 831, 835-36 (App. Div. 1988).
113. Id. A state trial court had previously struck down a plan by the Commissioner
of the DOT to enforce the MBE requirements by imposing sanctions on firms who
tried to circumvent the requirements. Callanan Indus. v. White, 500 N.Y.S.2d 487
(Sup. Ct. 1986). Both Rex Paving and Callanan Industries relied on Fullilove v.
Beame, 48 N.Y.2d 375 (1979) (per curiam), holding that the state's Human Rights
Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1982), prohibited the Mayor of New York

City from unilaterally imposing regulations that required firms engaged in construction contracts with the city to submit affirmative action hiring plans.
114. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 310-318 (McKinney Supp. 1993).

115. Id. § 310(7).
116. See infra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.

117. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 310(1), 314(1).
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compasses African-Americans," 8 Hispanics, Native Americans and
Alaskans, and Asians and Pacific Islanders. 119 A "women-owned
business enterprise" is defined as a sole proprietorship, partnership, or corporation that is at least fifty-percent substantially and
continuously owned by one or more female United States citizens
or resident aliens and is authorized to do business in the state. 2 0
Article 15-A also created the Office of Minority and Women's
Business Development (OMWBD), which is headed by a Director
having broad discretion to enforce the provisions of the act.' 2 '
Most importantly, Article 15-A grants the Director significant
rulemaking authority intended to facilitate the administration of its
policies.12 2 It also allows the Director to review the activity of the
various state agencies to ensure compliance with the statute and
any regulations promulgated thereunder. 23 The Director also has
the authority to resolve disputes arising from the124Act or from any
rules or regulations that he or she promulgates.
Article 15-A itself does not mandate quotas or other specific
participation levels for MBEs.125 The statute uses more general
language that appears to be designed to monitor minority participation on state projects and to identify problem areas:
118. Id. § 310(8). The statute specifically identifies "black African-Americans" as
minority group members, presumably in contrast to Afrikaaners and Arab AfricanAmericans, who go unmentioned.

119. Id.
120. Id. § 310(15).
121. Id. § 311(1).
122. The rulemaking authority is designed to "ensure that Certified businesses shall
be given the opportunity for meaningful participation in the performance of state
contracts and to identify those state contracts for which certified businesses may best
bid ... so as to facilitate the award of a fair share of state contracts to such businesses." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 313(1).
123. Id. § 311(3)(d).
124. In the case of an alleged violation by a contractor that cannot otherwise be
resolved, the Director can refer the case to the American Arbitration Association.
The Association will make recommendations of whether a violation has in fact occurred, and what sanctions, fines, or penalties, if any, should be imposed. The Director is then free to adopt the recommendations or make a new one provided that the
Director does not impose a more severe sanction. Id. § 316.
125. Although Article 15-A does not mandate or specifically authorize the use of
such minimum requirements, it does contemplate their use by the compliance regulations and the various state agencies: "nothing in this section shall authorize the director or any contracting agency to impose any requirement on a contractor or
subcontractor except with respect to a state contract." Id. § 313(2); see also id.
§ 313(8) (a contracting agency may file a complaint with the Director of OMWBD if it
feels that "a contractor is failing or refusing to comply with the minority and womenowned business participation requirements as set forth in the state contract").
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Contracting agencies shall include or require to be included with
respect to state contracts... (a) provisions requiring contractors
to make a good faith effort to solicit active participation by...
certified businesses ... (b) [provisions] requiring the parties to
agree as a condition of entering into such contract, to be bound
by the [Director's regulatory]
provisions of section three hun1 26
dred sixteen of this article.
In addition, the statute requires bidding contractors to submit
MBE utilization plans before receiving contracts. 127 A utilization

plan is
a plan prepared by a contractor and submitted in connection
with a proposed state contract. The utilization plan shall identify certified minority and women-owned business enterprises, if
known, that have committed to perform work in connection
with the proposed state contract as well as any such enterprises,
if known, which the contractor intends to use in connection with
128
the contractor's performance of the proposed state contract.
The act also provides for a waiver system whereby the state
agency receiving any bids for public contracts could grant waivers
of future contract goal requirements upon a showing by participants of good faith efforts to comply. 129 The agency may also consider other evidence in granting a waiver, such as unavailability of
certified businesses qualified to perform the work, the size and
scope of the contract, and the availability of uncertified businesses
130
qualified to perform.
Despite these numerous provisions and the Legislature's aggressive goals, the legislative findings that accompanied the statute
made no reference to findings of discrimination or to an intent to
remedy specific past discrimination.' 3' The findings contained general assertions of New York State policy to promote equal opportunity in employment and state contracting.
It is hereby found and declared that it has been and remains the
policy of the state of New York to promote equal opportunity in
employment for all persons, without discrimination on account
of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, age, disability or marital status, to promote equality of economic opportunity for minority group members and women, and business enterprises
126. Id. § 313(2).
127. Id. § 313(4)(a).
128. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 310(9).

129. Id. § 313(5).
130. Id.
131. See Harrison I, 743 F. Supp. at 998.
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owned by them, and to eradicate through effective programs the
barriers that have unreasonably impaired access by minority and
women-owned 32 business enterprises to state contracting
opportunities.'
The findings did not include any statistical or anecdotal evidence of
prior state-perpetuated discrimination.
Pursuant to Section 311(1) of Article 15-A, 1 33 the Director of
OMWBD promulgated a set of compliance rules directed at the
various state agencies.13 The rules allowed the individual state
agencies to set their own W/MBE participation goals for each contract. The agencies were to base their goals on several criteria, including the number of certified W/MBEs available to perform the
work, the number of certified W/MBEs in the area as a percentage
known success or failure of W/MBEs
of total contractors, and the135
contracts.
state
obtaining
in
1 36
In Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Contractors, Inc. v. Cuomo,
(HarrisonI), two construction companies challenged Article 15-A
and its accompanying compliance rules, claiming that they violated
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantees, both facially
and as applied. The construction company's inability to meet DOT
participation goals threatened its state contracts. The contractors
sued the Governor and the DOT to prevent them from enforcing
the project-specific set-aside provisions. 137 The district court
granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the DOT from enforcing Article 15-A, the compliance regulations, or the DOT provisions against the contractor. 38 Before granting the injunction, the
court found that the plaintiff had been exposed to a risk of incurring serious harm and had showed a likelihood of success on the
merits. 39 In determining whether this likelihood existed, the court
of the statute in light of Croson's
assessed the constitutionality
140
review.
of
standard
The court first examined the purported compelling state interest
underlying the statute but failed to discern any evidence that the
legislature had made findings of past discrimination by either the
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

1988 N.Y. Laws, ch. 261, § 62.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 540-544 (1990).
Id. § 543.2.
743 F. Supp. 977 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
Id. at 978.
Id. at 1005.
Id. at 995.
743 F. Supp. 997.

1126

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XXI

state or the firms with which the state had contracted.' 4 1 The only
evidence to support the program consisted of generalized and
142
wholly conclusory assertions that there had been discrimination,
evidence similar to that which the Croson Court dismissed as inadequate to support such a plan. 43 Furthermore, the statute and the
compliance regulations applied to all state contracts, indicating to
the court that the state's goal was to achieve racial balancing rather
than to remedy the effects of past discrimination.14 The court did
not determine whether the program was narrowly tailored, because
the plan failed the first prong of strict scrutiny analysis.
Following the court's decision to grant the preliminary injunction, the OMWBD issued emergency regulations suspending both
the enforcement of any outstanding participation goals and the imposition of sanctions for failing to meet the goals on pending DOT
projects. 4 5 The emergency regulations were to remain in effect indefinitely, or until the OMWBD could determine that there was a
firm factual basis to support the enforcement of the requirements. 46 The OMWBD then directed all state agencies to cease
47
the enforcement of any set-aside requirements.1
Notwithstanding DOT's suspension of the participation goals,
the plaintiffs 148 continued their constitutional challenge to Article
15-A. In HarrisonII, 1 4 9 the District Court conducted a hearing to
make a final disposition of the. dispute over enforcement of the
DOT participation requirements. The court held that the suspension of the requirements rendered the as-applied challenge moot
because the plaintiffs could not be presently harmed by them.150
The court then considered the facial invalidity challenge and determined that Article 15-A did not mandate preferences for W/MBEs
but merely encouraged efforts to increase participation by W/
MBEs in state contracting.' 51 Based on such language and the
141. Id. at 1001.
142. Id.
143. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-99.
144. 743 F. Supp. at 1001.
145. See Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Contractors, Inc. v. Cuomo, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13962, Oct. 1, 1991, at *12 (N.D.N.Y Oct. 1, 1992), aff'd 981 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.
1992) (HarrisonII).
146. Id. at *13.
147. Id.
148. A second plaintiff joined the suit after issuance of the preliminary injunction,
seeking the same relief as Harrison.
149. HarrisonII, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13962, at *13.

150. Id. at *20.
151. Id. at *25.
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1 52
wide latitude granted to the OMWBD in enforcing the statute,
that Article 15-A was not facially
the court held
1 53
unconstitutional.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in all respects. 54 The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court' 55
that the repeal of the compliance regulations rendered the plaintiffs' as applied attack on Article 15-A moot because enforcement
against the plaintiffs remained indefinite and uncertain.1 56 Regarding the facial challenge, the court of appeals focused on the general
language of Article 15-A, which did not require minimum participation in all circumstances but merely authorized the solicitation of
minority participation. 57 The court of appeals specifically refused
to characterize Article 15-A as mandating the use of set-aside contracts. It stated that unless the statute mandated the implementation of regulations requiring set-asides, a court could not view it as
mandating any racial preferences. 58 Nevertheless, the court, noting the pendency of the state's new findings, 59 acknowledged that
the constitutionality of the statute could become an issue again1 6if
0
the state decided to re-implement the use of set-aside provisions.

The Constitutionality of the New Regulations
In July 1992, the New York Division of Minority and Women's
Business Development (DMWBD), formerly OMWBD and now
under the auspices of the state's Department Of Economic Development,' 6 ' issued findings, titled "Opportunity Denied!,"'1 62 detailing what it considered to be strong evidence of discrimination in
the state's public contracting process. Along with the findings,
DMWBD re-issued the compliance regulations 163 in basically the
IV.

152. Id. at *24. The court relied on Cone Corp. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 921
F.2d 1190 (11th Cir. 1991), which upheld a plan enforced through administrative
regulation.
153. Harrison11, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13962, at *25.

154. Harrison II, 981 F.2d at 62.
155. See supra note 150.

156. Harrison 1I, 981 F.2d at 59.
157. Id. at 60.
158. Id.
159. See infra part IV.
160. Harrison H, 981 F.2d at 59.
161. N.Y. ECON. DEV. LAW § 115-120 (McKinney Supp. 1994).

162. DIVISION OF MINORITY AND WOMEN'S BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, OPPORTUNITY DENIED!: A STUDY OF RACIAL AND SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION RELATED TO
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING IN NEW YORK STATE, Apr. 1992 [hereinafter OPPORTUNITY DENIED].
163. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 540-544 (1992).
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same form as the 1990 regulations.64 Thus, the constitutional issue
once again ripened: 165 does the failure to award a state contract to
a non-minority contractor on the basis of the race of its ownership
and management deny that contractor the guarantees of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
A.

Do Findings Show a Compelling Interest?

Under Croson, a state or its subdivision must show by concrete
findings of past discrimination in the contracting process a compelling state interest in remedying discrimination. 66 According to the
Ninth Circuit in Coral Construction Co., a combination of statistical and anecdotal evidence of discrimination comprises an ideal
foundation for proving a compelling interest. 67 For Article 15-A
and the new compliance regulations to survive strict scrutiny,
therefore, the findings made by the DMWBD should contain
meaningful statistical, analysis supported by relevant anecdotal
evidence.
1. Statistical Evidence
The DMWBD report on discrimination in New York's contracting process includes statistics 68 compiled by DMWBD's Office of Management Information Systems (MIS Report) that
reflect the utilization of minority and women-owned businesses in
state projects for fiscal year 1990-91, the period during which the
original compliance regulations were suspended. 1 69 DMWBD

stated that its numbers were designed to be as conservative as possible by always using the higher of any conflicting minority partici164. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 540-544 (1990).
165. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 11.

167. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
168. DMWBD summarized its statistical data using various populations. For example, one set of statistics surveys minority and women participation based on the total
dollarvalue of contractsoutstanding. See, e.g., OPPORTUNITY DENIED, supra note 162,
app. B at fig. 4.1. Another set uses total dollar value of contracts awarded state-wide
as its population. See, e.g., id. fig. 5.1. A third set uses total dollar expenditures during

the period studied. See, e.g., id. fig. 5.3. Still another set bases its findings on number
of contractors rather than dollar values. See, e.g., id. tbl. 4.1 (emphasis added).
169. OPPORTUNITY DENIED, supra note 162, app. B at 5. The report also includes
privately conducted studies that looked at the impact that discrimination in employment and admission to trade unions and organizations had on the formation of minority businesses. Because formation of a business often follows expertise in the field of
that business, discrminatory hiring prevented minorities from gaining the expertise
needed to even form a business, thereby leading to underestimation of MBE availability. Id. app. A at 33-41.
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pation levels. 170 Because the report includes statistical analysis for
only one fiscal year, a court may consider such a sample too small
to demonstrate systematic discrimination constituting a compelling
interest. This problem is potentially offset by a very large one year
17 1
sample in addition to the annually renewable nature of the plan.
The report states the total dollar value of contracts outstanding,
and then breaks the data down among women and minorities generally. 172 According to those statistics, out of $4.803 billion in state
contracts outstanding, MBEs received $265.97 million (5.54%) in
contracts, and WBEs received $114.14 million (2.37%). 173 These
results represented a substantial decline in participation percentages from fiscal year 1989-90, when Article 15-A enforcement was
still in effect. In 1989-90, MBEs received approximately $223 million out of a $2.9 billion total (7.7%), while WBEs received $130
million (4.4%).174 The report also breaks down the total contract
expenditures by racial group and by non-minority and minority women. 175 As Table 1 demonstrates, the statistics show a large disparity between the number of minority contractors who are ready,
willing, and able to perform on state projects and the number of
contracts actually awarded to them; it details the disparity among
blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans.

170. Id. app. A at 18.

171. The state agencies cannot fail to update their data and goals every year without violating the letter of the compliance regulations and the spirit of Article 15-A.

New York's statistical sample will grow as the state gathers its annual data, and thus
any new annual statistics will presumably support and influence any new annual goals,
although such new data should not support previous years' participation levels. See

infra note 203 and accompanying text.
172. Id. app. B at fig. 4.7; see supra note 168.

173.

OPPORTUNITY DENIED,

supra note 162, app. B at fig. 4.7.

174. Id. app. B at 81. The decline from 7.7% to 5.5% for MBEs represented a

28.6% drop, while the drop for women was 45.4%. Id. app. B at 82.
175. Of all expenditures to MBEs, Blacks received 39.8%; Asian-Americans 17.3%; Hispanic Americans - 26.0%; Native Americans - .3%; other groups - 16.6%.
Of expenditures to women-owned business enterprises, non-minority firms received
98.3% and minority firms received 1.7%. OPPORTUNITY DENIED, supra note 162, app.
B at fig. 5.3.
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Table 1
Available MBEs 17 6

Utilized MBEs 1 7 7

Ratio 178

African-Americans
Hispanics
Asians

5.74%
2.93%
2.2%

1.84%
1.05%
1.96%

.32
.36
.89

Native Amer.
Minority Women

0.7%
6.14%

0.88%
0.15%

1.27
.02

6.9%

2.31%

.33

13.04%

2.48%

.19

Minority Group

Non-min. Women
Total Women

The first column represents the number of available and
qualified minority contractors by race as a percentage of all
contractors. For example, 5.74% of all qualified contractors are
owned and operated by African-Americans. The second column
reflects the amount of contracting dollars awarded to minority
firms as a percentage of total contracting dollars. For example,
African-American firms received 1.84% of all work for which they
were qualified. The third column is simply the quotient of the
second column divided by the first. A ratio of 1.0 reflects
utilization exactly equal to availability, meaning that W/MBEs are
receiving their proportionate share of state contracts. A ratio of
less than 1.0 represents underutilization.
With the exceptions of Native American and Asian-American
contractors, the data reflect wide disparity between availability and
employment of W/MBEs. The divergence is particularly acute
among minority women, where the rate of utilization was only two
percent of availability. Non-minority women did not fare much
better; utilization was less than one-third of availability. The
disparity is also obvious among African-American and Hispanic
firms, with ratios of 0.32 and 0.36 respectively. As the Ninth
Circuit stated in Coral Construction Co., such disparate results may
alone support affirmative action classifications.' 79
Numbers mean little, however, unless they are placed in a proper
context. In evaluating the statistics from New York, it may be
helpful to look at cases that deal with discrimination in areas other
176. Availability is computed as a percentage of all qualified contractors statewide.

Id. app. B at tbl. 3.1.
177. Id. app. B at tbl. 4.1.
178. The ratio is equal to the percentage of available MBEs to MBEs actually

utilized. Id. app. B at tbl. 6.1; see supra note 168.
179. 941 F.2d at 918 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,

307-08 (1977)). On the other hand, Native Americans received a greater percentage
of contracts than their available numbers would indicate; the findings would therefore

not appear to support the use of set-aside provisions for that group.
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than public contracting. In assessing disparities in public
contracting, neither the Supreme Court nor the lower federal
courts have laid out what statistical evidence will satisfy the
compelling interest standard of Croson.180 In her opinion in
Croson, Justice O'Connor endorsed no specific statistical analysis
that would satisfy the compelling interest standard. The opinion
did refer, however, to the statistical analysis conducted in Title VII
cases, which
in turn relied on the analysis from jury discrimination
18 1
cases.

The Title VII and jury discrimination cases use a standard
deviation analysis to examine statistical disparities and determine
whether such disparities are statistically significant. To determine
the standard deviation, one must compute the square root of the
product of the total number in the sample (N), the probability of
selecting a minority (P(x)), and the probability of selecting a nonminority (1-P(x)).1 8 2 The probability of selecting a minority is
180. See Daron S. Fitch, Note, The Aftermath of Croson: A Blueprint for a
ConstitutionallyPermissible Minority Set-Aside Program,53 OHIO ST. L.J. 555, 572-74
(1992).
181. The court's opinion cited Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S.
299 (1977), a federal government Title VII suit against a school district in suburban St.
Louis, Missouri. The government sought to establish prima facie evidence of the
district's discriminatory hiring of minority teachers by showing gross statistical
disparities. In addressing the government's statistical evidence, the Hazelwood Court
in turn relied on Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), for a suitable test.
Castaneda involved a habeus corpus petition, where a Mexican-American prisoner
based his claim on the underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans on the grand jury
that indicted him for rape. Id. at 483-84. See Fitch, supra note 180, at 572-82. Fitch
proposes a complete statistical evaluation that includes multiple regression analysis,
which may account for non-race considerations, such as bonding requirements. Id. at
581.
182. Castaneda,430 U.S. at 496 n.17. This formula is applicable only to a binomial
distribution whereby an occurrence can be assigned either a value of 0 or 1,
depending on whether the occurrence is a failure or success. See GARY SMITH,
STATISTICAL REASONING, 156-57 (1985). For example, every public contracting
dollar goes either to a minority or non-minority firm, or to an African-American or
non-African-American firm, and so on. Each minority group will have its own
binomial distribution, with its own standard deviation.
Fitch did not employ the exact standard deviation analysis advocated by the
Castaneda Court; he devised a formula that he called the standard deviation quotient,
which requires actual numbers of contracts awarded. Fitch, supra note 180, at 578.
New York also used a different test, the "t-test," to determine statistical significance.
See OPPORTUNITY DENIED, supra note 162, app. B at 66-69. The t-test uses a
distribution other than the binomial distribution to arrive at a t-statistic, another
variation on the standard deviation. See DONALD L. HARNETr, STATISTICAL
METHODS, 378-81 (3d ed. 1982). When the t-statistic is greater than 1.96, the
discrepancy is statistically significant. SMITH, supra, at 306-07. New York computed a
t-statistic of -41.21 for all MBEs, and -38.22, -25.57, and -3.84 for African-Americans,
Hispanic-Americans and Asian-Americans respectively. OPPORTUNITY DENIED,
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equal to the percentage of qualified minorities in the sample. 83
For large statistical samples, if the difference between the observed
and expected values is greater than two or three standard
deviations,18 4a claim that the discrepancy is random would be
"suspect."'
When the randomness of a statistical distribution is
suspect, it can be assumed that subjective factors influenced the
distribution. Race would be considered such a subjective factor.
The standard deviation analysis can be applied to the statistics
supplied by New York in support of the current compliance
regulations. Table 2 illustrates the obvious discrepancies that cast
doubt on a claim that New York's history of awarding public
contracts has been completely random.
Table 2
MINORITY
GROUP

kB$

P(x)

STANDARD
DEVIATION

P(x) x K$

SDD

Total
265.97
.1157
22,158
555.71
13,044
Afr-Amer.
88.38
.0574
16,093
275.69
11,640
Hispanic
50.43
.0293
11,683
140.73
7729
Asian-Amer.
94.14
.022
11,527
105.67
1134
where:
k $ = actual contract dollars awarded to each group (millions).
P(x) = probability of being hired, based on percentage of population of qualified contractors.
P(x) x k $ = expected contract dollars for each group (millions).
SDD = number of standard deviations below expected contract dollars.

As Table 2 shows, total minorities represent 11.57% of the
qualified contracting population. Based on $4.803 billion in public
supra note 162, app. B at tbl. 6.3. A negative t-statistic represents underutilization. Id.
app. B at 66-67. Because the t-statistic requires more detailed computations than is
necessary here, and because the MIS report does not set forth the mathematical steps
by which it computed the t-statistics, this Note will not rely on it.
The test employed in this Note computes its standard deviation from percentages of
minorities receiving dollars, as the Court in Castaneda computed its standard
deviation from percentages of Mexican-Americans in jury pools. In that case,
Mexican-Americans made up 79.1% of the local population that was statutorily
qualified to serve on a grand jury. The grand jury openings during the relevant time
period totaled 870, so that the standard deviation was the square root of the product
of 870, 0.791, and 0.209, which equals approximately 12:
( 870 x .791 x .209 = 12).
The CastanedaCourt may have oversimplified its standard deviation analysis, yet that
test remains the law for jury and employment discrimination cases. Although the
applicability of the test to dollar amounts may be open to debate, the discrepancies in
New York are so large that whatever similar test that might be used would likely yield
the same conclusion.
183. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 496 n.17.
184. Id.
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contracting dollars, 85 the standard deviation is 22,158. Absent any
subjective factors, minorities would be expected to receive $555.71
million in contracting, yet received only $265.97 million, or 13,044
standard deviations less. For individual minority groups, the
discrepancies are similarly large. African-Americans received
$88.38 million in contracts, 11,640 standard deviations below the
expected total of $275.69 million. Hispanics and Asian-Americans
received contracting totals that were 7729 and 1134 standard
deviations respectively below expected. Recall that a discrepancy
of more than two or three standard deviations renders the results
racially suspect. In New York, the differences in standard
deviations are in the thousands.
Other statistics also reflect discrepancies. For example, statewide utilization goals, rather than just availability, compared to
results, also reveals a statistical imbalance. The utilization goals for
MBEs among the various state agencies averaged 8.91% of
contracting dollars. 186 The actual result, however, was that MBEs
received only 62% of the goal (5.54% of contracting dollars). 87
The average goal for WBEs was 3.77%, while the result was only
88
63% of the goal (2.38% of contracting dollars).
2. Anecdotal Evidence
In addition to the substantial supply of statistics, the state's findings also offer a considerable amount of anecdotal evidence. Most
of the anecdotal evidence takes the form of interviews with, and
the direct testimony of, more than two hundred fifty witnesses concerning numerous cases of actual discrimination against minorities
and women in areas such as financing and securing supplies. 189 For
example, several witnesses affiliated with firms, including individuals of each of the statutorily delineated minority groups, described
how banks refused to make loans to them even though the same
banks would loan to non-minority male firms of similar size. 190
The process was not necessarily infallible, for the testimony was
not delivered in adversarial proceedings. Rather, New York's
DMWBD conducted interviews and held public hearings whereby
185. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
186.

OPPORTUNITY DENIED,

supra note 162, app. B at fig. 7.1.

187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. app. A at 57-62.
190. Id. app. A at 66-70. Other witnesses testified to similar treatment from suppliers, who would often agree to deals by phone, only to reject them once they had met
the witnesses and found out he or she was a minority. Id. app. A at 71-74.
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witnesses would be questioned by DMWBD employees. 191 Moreover, the state report contains no indication whether opponents to
an affirmative action program were invited to testify, or whether
any witnesses were subject to cross examination. 92 In addition, a
large portion of the anecdotal evidence lends little support to a
state-sponsored affirmative action program because much of the
excerpted testimony concerns alleged discrimination by private
parties, not by state agencies or employees.
The state, however, did receive limited testimony about discriminatory practices by its own agencies and employees. An AfricanAmerican owner of a plumbing supply company, for example, related how he had inquired about bidding on two state projects;
state employees turned him down, stating that he had to be "on the
list," although he had personal knowledge that non-minority firms
not on the list were routinely accepted. 93 Further, in the subcontracting process, prime contractors on state projects would not seek
bids from MBEs or when they did, they would often send incomplete documentation or wait until the eleventh hour to contact
MBEs, making feasible bids impossible. 94 This discrimination led
to the outright failure of some firms and effectively deterred some
individuals from commencing operations, preventing them from
"making the traditional leap from laborers to entrepreneurs.' 95
In conducting and releasing these findings, the state has most
likely corrected its earlier error by providing findings necessary to
establish a compelling state interest. The statistics alone could possibly support some variation of an affirmative action plan, although
the analysis only covers one year. The state did not stop there,
however, as the supply of anecdotal evidence, including testimony
about years of persistent use of double standards in various stages
of the contracting process, compliments the numbers and gives
them meaning. This combination of evidence would, in all
probabability, satisfy the standard that the King County model
advocates.
191. OPPORTUNITY DENIED, supra note 162, app. A at 57-59.
192. Professor Wigmore, in his renowned treatise on evidence, stated that "[cross
examination is] the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 5
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (3d. ed.
1940)..
193. OPPORTUNITY DENIED, supra note 162, app. A at 80. A number of witnesses
also testified that state employers regularly scrutinized their work, while ordinarily
approving similar work by white-owned firms. Id. app. A at 80-83.
194. Id. app. A at 87-90.
195. OPPORTUNITY DENIED, supra note 162, Executive Summary at ix-xi; see
Croson, 488 U.S. at 498.
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B.

Is the Remedy Narrowly Tailored to the Violation?

In assessing whether the state's remedy is narrowly tailored
under the King County standard, the state must first offer raceneutral solutions before or in conjunction with race specific measures. 196 In this respect, New York has sought to correct the racial
imbalance through such activity. The state has sponsored numerous assistance programs aimed at helping W/MBEs to secure financing, to develop management skills, and to overcome market
entry barriers. 97 Other programs have sought to ease financial
barriers by developing financial assistance and bond elimination
plans, and by giving tax credits to businesses from areas with high
unemployment and poverty.' 98 The race-neutral aid has not remedied racial imbalances to the satisfaction of the OMWBD however.
Some measures can even be viewed as counterproductive. The
bond elimination practices, for example, may allow contractors to
qualify for state projects, but such waivers can result in a work
stoppage on a project if the contractor should become bankrupt.
Because the contractor does not hold a bond, its subcontractors
have no guarantee that they will be paid, and consequently have no
incentive to continue work.
The second indicator of a narrowly tailored remedy is program
flexibility. 199 The language used in Article 15-A and the compliance regulations demonstrate such flexibility. Both the statute and
the regulations use the phrase "participation goals" applicable to
individual projects,2 ° ° rather than system-wide requirements or
quotas. 20 1 Nevertheless, the state does not escape closer scrutiny
simply because it sets "goals" rather than "requirements" or "quotas. '20 2 The state has acknowledged this caveat, however, as all
goals are set annually in response to the previous year's participation levels.20 3 The plan's waiver system2 °0 reinforces its flexibility;
196. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
197. OPPORTUNITY DENIED, supra note 162, Executive Summary at xi.
198. Id.

199. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
200. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 313(8); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
(1992).

REGS.

tit. 9 § 542.2(a)

201. Harrison I, 743 F. Supp. at 980.
202. The term does not change the reality; the enforcement of the plan may still

mandate the participation of minorities and women to the exclusion of white males.
See O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 423-24 (D.C. Cir.

1992).
203. N.Y.

COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9 § 541.3(a) (1992). If the state fails to
update its goals annually, it violates its own compliance regulations. See supra notes
168-171 and accompanying text.
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the statute authorizes state agencies to waive goal requirements
upon a showing by the bidder that despite good faith efforts to
comply, minority participation at goal levels is impracticable or impossible.2 °5 Unlike the faulty waiver system used by Richmond's
unconstitutional plan in Croson,2° New York will waive minority
requirements where the state agency issuing the contract "determines there is not a reasonable availability of contractors on the
list of certified businesses to furnish services for the project. '20 7
New York's waiver scheme is not ideal, however, as neither Article
15-A nor the compliance regulations specifically provide for a
waiver upon a showing that a specific certified MBE that might
receive preferential treatment has not suffered discrimination in
New York.2 °8 New York instead relies on the discretion of the
DMWBD to determine if a waiver is proper.
The third indicator of a narrowly tailored plan is that it is limited
in geographic scope to the jurisdiction enacting it. 20 9 Under New
York's plan, an MBE must be a "certified business" to qualify for
any benefits that Article 15-A and the compliance regulations confer. The only requirements a firm must satisfy to be a "certified
business" are minority ownership and control, and authorization to
do business in New York State.21 0 This definition is broad enough
to expose the plan to some problems regarding certified firms that
operate primarily outside of the state. If a firm historically has had
little or no actual contact with New York other than receiving authorization to do business, and it performs most or all of its work in
other states, New York would have difficulty in making a causal
connection between discrimination in New York State and any injury to that firm.21 ' Such a firm falls within the definition of certi204. See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text; see also, N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 9 § 543.7 (1992).
205. Id.

206. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
207. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 313(5). Richmond only granted waivers in "exceptional
circumstances" where "every feasible attempt has been made to comply." Croson,
488 U.S. at 478-79.
208. In Croson, the Court criticized Richmond's waiver because it did not allow a
waiver even upon an affirmative showing that higher bids submitted by MBEs did not

result from any discrimination. 488 U.S. at 508.
209. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS., tit. 9 § 543.8 (1992).
210. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 310(7)(d).
211. The Ninth Circuit in Coral Construction Co. v. King County struck down the
portion of the County's affirmative action plan that enabled any business, regardless
of its operations within the County, that was the victim of discrimination within its
particular geographical area of operation to participate in the program. The court
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fled business, however. Thus, a firm that has .not materially
suffered from discrimination in New York could possibly profit
from the plan at the expense of non-minority firms. Such an effect
might invalidate the statute with respect to foreign corporations in
this class, and could lead a court to doubt the legitimacy of New
York's stated rationale for enacting the plan.
C. The Bottom Line: Does Article 15-A Pass Muster?
In evaluating the constitutionality of New York State's new regulations and the sufficiency of the findings underlying their enactment, a court should adopt the model advocated by the Ninth
Circuit in Coral Construction Co.212 The court in that case fashioned clear criteria for assessing the strengths and weaknesses of
an affirmative action plan. It suggested a number of logical requirements for both prongs of the strict scrutiny analysis. The
Ninth Circuit's rule that a state may support affirmative action legislation by producing findings of system-wide discrimination after
enactment, 213 however, is troubling. It appears to conflict with the
unequivocal language of Croson: "[s]tates and their subdivisions
some specificity
• ..must identify [the] discrimination ...with
214
relief.
race-conscious
use
may
before they
New York accepts the Ninth Circuit's timing rule without any
reservation and even cites Croson for the proposition that
"[b]efore enacting such a remedial law, the State need not first
make findings of past discrimination. See Croson, at 724 (quoting
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277 .... ,,215 Neither the pages in Croson that
constitute the state's citation nor the case from which the state says
Croson quotes, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,1 6 contains
such a provision. In fact, the Court in Wygant, as it did again in
Croson, stated just the opposite: "a public employer.., must enrequired a showing that a participating MBE was "victimized by discrimination within
King County." 941 F.2d at 925 (emphasis added). The court went on to state that an
MBE could meet this burden by showing prior attempts to do business in the County,
assuming the County had made the requisite findings of illegal discrimination. "[I]f

systematic discrimination in the County is shown, then it is fair to presume that an
MBE was victimized by the discrimination. For the presumption to attach to the

MBE, however, it must be established that the MBE is, or attempted to become, an
active participant in the County's business community." Id.
212. See supra notes 53-66 and accompanying text; supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
214. 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989).
215. OPPORTUNITY DENIED, supra note 162, app. A at 10.
216. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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sure that, before it embarks on an affirmative-action program, it
has convincing evidence that remedial action is warranted. That is,
it must have sufficient evidence 217
to justify the conclusion that there
has been prior discrimination.
The Ninth Circuit in Coral Construction Co. thus went significantly beyond Croson. Consequently, the effectiveness of its
model is strengthened by examining whether a plan is narrowly tailored rather than establishing whether past discrimination justifies
the plan. If the plan is eventually held unconstitutional, on account
of a lack of a compelling interest before enactment, the model only
mandates suspension of the program and does not offer any remedy for non-minority businesses that are denied public contracts
while awaiting the state's justification. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit, unlike the Supreme Court or the other federal circuits, has
provided more guidance for establishing what constitutes a compelling interest.
Under the Ninth Circuit's Coral Construction Co. model, a state
must provide concrete evidence of past discrimination, otherwise
the race-conscious measure "is presumptively invalid. ' 218 Prior to
1991, New York had no legitimate evidence of discrimination, yet it
enacted Article 15-A in 1988. In fact, the meager legislative findings that accompanied the original enactment strongly suggest that
the state enacted the statute for political rather than remedial reasons. 219 Thus, until New York suspended enforcement in 1991,
those provisions of Article 15-A and the compliance regulations
that authorized the state agencies to set minimum participation requirements were "presumptively invalid." Nonetheless, because
presumptively invalid does not mean per se invalid, the state had
the opportunity to rebut the presumption. Thus, the 1991 repeal of
the compliance regulations and the recent findings have justified
the implementation of new compliance regulations and saved Article 15-A.
In contrast to the earlier dearth of supporting evidence, the
measures that New York has since taken to comply with the strict
criteria of Croson now indicate a strong intent to actually remedy
the effects of past discrimination. The new study satisfies the constitutionally required compelling interest by thoroughly detailing
discriminatory practices and effects through statistical and anecdo217. Id. at 277.
218. 941 F.2d at 920.

219. "[Article 15-Al appears to be aimed more at racial balancing than at rectifying
the effects of identified discrimination." Harrison I, 743 F. Supp. at 1001.
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tal studies. Without this evidence, New York could not have justified the continued enforcement of Article 15-A. Yet, the
possibility remains that a one year statistical analysis does not constitute a sufficient sample to adequately demonstrate discrimination. 220 The nature of the standard deviation analysis, 221 however,
which necessarily compensates for smaller samples as well as the
large sample for fiscal year 1989-90, reduces the likelihood that a
court would deem New York's statistical analysis inadequate.
In addition to showing a compelling interest, the state has, with
one possible exception, satisfied the "narrowly tailored" requirement, due mostly to the flexibility allowed by its regulatory
scheme. By its language, Article 15-A leaves much of its enforcement to administrative regulation. That alone may not have been
enough to save it, for a facially neutral statute may still be invalid if
the state enforces it in a discriminatory manner.2 22 In New York's
case, however, enforcement is not discriminatory because the compliance regulations, the means by which Article 15-A is applied, do
not appear to require, authorize, or condone constitutionally impermissible racial preferences.223 The state sets all preferences
through its state agencies, on an annual, reviewable basis.224 Furthermore, both Article 15-A and the compliance regulations provide for a system of waivers, whereby any annual agency or project
participation goals may be suspended if they are not feasible in
individual cases.225
The facts of the Harrisonlitigation 226 illustrate the overall flexibility of New York's plan. In that case, the state DOT delayed
awarding the contract to Harrison & Burrowes ("Harrison") because Harrison failed to submit a satisfactory MBE utilization
plan.227 Rather than simply rejecting Harrison's bid, the regulations required the DOT to grant the Harrison the opportunity to
show that it was legitimately unable to meet any MBE utilization
requirements. When the DOT was satisfied that the firm had
shown a good faith effort to comply, it waived the requirement and
proceeded with the projects with Harrison as the contractor.228
220. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 182-185 and accompanying text.

222. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 351 (1886).
223. See supra notes 200-205 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
225.
226.
227.
228.

See supra notes 204-205 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 136-160 and accompanying text.
Harrison I, 743 F. Supp. at 986.
Id.
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One area that remains problematic, however, is that the geographic scope of the plan may impermissibly exceed the limits of
the Coral ConstructionCo. model. As discussed earlier, Article 15A allows firms from outside the state to be certified as MBEs and
enjoy the plan's preferences as if they were domestic firms as long
as they are authorized to do business in New York.2"9 The statute
does not disqualify firms that have never actually attempted to do
business in New York or enjoy success in other states. A foreign
MBE thus might have suffered no discrimination in New York or
the state in which it does most of its business. In either case, however, the foreign firm may still qualify for the preferences promulgated under the compliance regulations solely because of the race
of its ownership.
Applying the facts of Coral Construction Co. to the New York
plan reveals this problem. The plaintiff in that case, Coral Construction, was an Oregon corporation with a branch office in King
County, Washington. Coral was the lowest bidder for a contract to
install guardrails along several King County roadways, yet the
county awarded the contract to an Oregon-based MBE.23 ° The
Ninth Circuit struck down the provision in King County's plan that
allowed foreign MBEs to qualify for preferential treatment if they
suffered discrimination where they operate. 231 The court held that
a foreign MBE had to show that it suffered discrimination in King
County. Discrimination could be presumed if the county could
show systematic discrimination and the MBE could show that it
was, or had attempted to become,
"an active participant in the
2' 32
County's business community.
Assume hypothetically that the Coral Construction Co. scenario
occurred in New York rather than Washington State, that Coral is
a New Jersey corporation with a branch office in New York, and
that the MBE also is a New Jersey firm. A New Jersey MBE qualifies for the New York plan merely by being authorized to do business in New York; neither Article 15-A nor the compliance
regulations require a foreign MBE to show that it had attempted to
participate in New York business. If this New Jersey MBE has
never previously bid on any project in New York, New York could
not make the requisite causal connection between discrimination in
229. See supra notes 210-211 and accompanying text.
230. Coral Constr. Co., 941 F.2d at 914.
231. Id. at 925.

232. Id.
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New York and any injury to the New Jersey MBE.233 In such a
case, Coral would have a cause of action under the equal protection clause if it was qualified to perform the work required and if it
submitted the lowest bid, yet lost the contract to the New Jersey
MBE.
New York can remedy this defect. First, the legislature can
amend the definition of certified business in Article 15-A to require that the MBE must have attempted to do business in New
York. Currently, a certified business need only be certified by the
DMWBD as minority-owned and operated and be authorized to
do business in New York.234 Article 15-A provides the DMWBD

with very few guidelines for certification other than that the
DMWBD "shall be responsible for verifying businesses as being
owned, operated, and controlled by minority group members or
women and for certifying such businesses. '' 235 The statute should

state, for example, that the DMWBD may only certify an MBE
after it has found that the MBE has attempted to do business in
New York.236
. Until the legislature acts, however, the DMWBD can ensure
through the waiver process 237 that foreign MBEs that have not suffered from discrimination in New York do not receive special treatment. Whenever a non-minority firm can show that the available
MBEs have not suffered from any discrimination in New York because they either have failed to attempt to do business in New
York or have actually prospered in New York, DMWBD should
waive any minority participation requirements.

233. The defect might even be more pronounced if the foreign MBE has enjoyed
significant success in its area of operations. Although success or failure outside of
New York is irrelevant to whether the MBE has been injured in New York, success
might prompt a non-minority firm to contest the award of a contract to a foreign
MBE. Even if the complainant does not prevail, it can hardly be claimed that such
litigation would have no effect on the contracting process.
234. See supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text.

235. N.Y.

EXEC. LAW

§ 314(2).

236. "If systemic discrimination in the [jurisdiction] is shown, then it is fair to presume that an MBE was victimized by the discrimination. For the presumption to
attach to the MBE, however, it must be established that the MBE is, or attempted to
become, an active participant in the [jurisdiction's] business community." Coral Constr. Co., 941 F.2d at 925.
237. See supra notes 53-74 and accompanying text; supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
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V. Conclusion
New York has satisfied the first prong of strict scrutiny by demonstrating a compelling interest for enacting Article 15-A and the
accompanying compliance regulations. It has also narrowly tailored most of its plan to remedy this interest. Nevertheless, New
York's plan could still face a challenge in any of three ways. First,
if the Supreme Court eventually overrules the Ninth and Second
Circuits and holds that the compelling state interest must be completely demonstrated before enacting race-conscious measures,
New York could be liable for any racial preferences enforced
before the 1991 repeal of Article 15-A's authority. Second, the
possibility remains that a one year statistical analysis does not constitute a sufficient sample to adequately demonstrate discrimination. The nature of the standard deviation analysis, however,
which necessarily compensates for smaller samples, as well as the
large sample for fiscal year 1989-90, reduce the likelihood that a
court would deem New York's statistical analysis inadequate.
Third, a non-minority contractor could challenge any contract
awarded preferentially to a foreign MBE that has minimal past
dealings with New York State. Nevertheless, New York has met its
burden of showing that its statistical and anecdotal evidence adequately support the use of minority set-asides in public contracting,
which Article 15-A and its accompanying compliance regulations
authorize.
John J. Sullivan

